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1. Between Internal and External Divisions
Marius Guderjan 
[…] we believe in the Union, the precious, precious 
bond between England, Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland [...] we believe in a union not just 
between the nations of the United Kingdom but 
between all of our citizens – every one of us – whoever 
we are and wherever we’re from. 
Theresa May, 7 July 2016 
British EU Membership and the External Division 
The relationship with the EU has always been uneasy and 
characterised by conflict since the first two applications of 
membership in the European Economic Community in 
1961 and 1967 that were both vetoed by Charles de Gaulle. 
When, in 1973, the UK eventually was allowed to join the 
club, and people confirmed this subsequently in the first 
nationwide referendum in 1975, Britain signed up for an 
economic project and not for a political union. Hence, the 
‘honeymoon’ did not last long. The Conservative party 
and Margaret Thatcher initially supported EU 
membership, but during the 1980s Euroscepticism grew 
in her party and subsequently in the 
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population. During her rule Thatcher became more hostile 
towards the European Community over disputes about 
British financial contributions and the reform of the Common 
Agriculture Policy. 
British exceptionalism has been further underlined by opt-
outs of major policy areas with every European treaty since 
Maastricht (except for the Nice Treaty). The UK did not join 
the Economic and Monetary Union in 1992, Justice and Home 
Affairs – since the Lisbon Treaty the Area of Freedom and 
Justice – the Schengen Area in 1997 and the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union in 2007. Under 
Tony Blair the British Government adopted a more pro-active 
and cooperative approach to the EU. However, the UK, Blair 
was reluctant to promote a strong European outlook to avoid 
confrontations with the Eurosceptic media. 
Even though David Cameron did not mean to take UK out of 
the EU, unintentionally he has led the UK to the ultimate opt-
out. Hence, on the day after the referendum he announced 
his resignation as Prime Minister with the words ‘I think the 
country requires fresh leadership to take it in this direction’. 
Looking at his record, until close to the referendum when he 
negotiated a ‘better for the UK’ and campaigned for Remain, 
he had done a good job in steering his country into Brexit. 
When Cameron became Tory leader, he urged his party to 
stop ‘banging on about Europe’. But his continuing 
concessions to the Eurosceptic wing of his party has kept the 
issue alive and triggered further demands. In 2009, the 
Conservative Party withdrew itself from the European 
People’s Party, which isolated the party in the European 
Parliament and damaged its influence over EU policies. After 
the Tories came to power in 2010, Government passed 
the European Act Union 2011, which foresees a nationwide 
referendum on further transfer of powers and future 
amendments of European Treaties. 
In the same year, Cameron upset the majority of European 
leaders by vetoing the Fiscal Compact (formally the Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union) in the European Council. In order to respond 
to the sovereign debt crisis, the Euro-states had to adopt the 
Fiscal Compact outside the existing treaty framework of the 
EU. Except for the UK, the Czech Republic and Croatia, which 
only joined the EU in 2013, all Member States ratified the 
Fiscal Compact. In his Bloomberg speech in 2013, Cameron 
claimed: ‘I am not a British isolationist. I don’t just want a 
better deal for Britain. I want a better deal for Europe too’, 
but his actions had shown a different picture. 
To unite his party and fight off UKIP, Cameron promised to 
negotiate better terms of EU membership and a referendum 
on British membership by the end of 2017. After his re-
election in 2015, a referendum became unavoidable. 
Cameron called for a fairer, more flexible and more 
competitive EU, but, except for limiting immigration, he had 
been very vague on what kind of reforms he wanted. 
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Nonetheless, he had to deliver some results from 
negotiations with the EU that allowed him to campaign for 
Remain. His position in the referendum, he threatened, 
would depend on the concessions to Britain. During his 
diplomatic mission across Europe, European leaders were 
generally open to provide Cameron with a success that he 
could sell at home to his Eurosceptic backbenchers and to the 
people. 
In February 2016, Cameron handed a listed four demands to 
Council President Donald Tusk: a four-year benefit freeze for 
EU-immigrants; a safeguard from decisions by Euro-insiders; 
economic competitiveness through cutting red-tape and 
negotiating new free-trade agreement with third parties; and 
an opt-out of the commitment to an ‘ever closer union’ and 
vetoing powers to national parliaments. Whilst Cameron was 
overall successful in the last three of his demands, with 
competitiveness being the least controversial, he was not 
given any concessions that would undermine the 
fundamental principle of the free movement of people. The 
best he got was an ‘emergency brake’ that restricts access of 
EU-immigrants to social benefits over a four-year period of 
time. However, Member States have to prove that the 
capacity of their welfare system are over-stretched, the 
European Council needs to decide on this matter in 
unanimity, and the brake only applies for a maximum of 
seven years, not 13 as originally demanded. 
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The deal that Cameron got during the European Summit on 
18-19 February did not foresee substantial reforms or hand 
back powers to the UK. Without a clear vision for reforms that 
could be supported by all Member States, the concessions 
were largely symbolic and it had not been clear how relevant 
they were in practice. The deal was meagre but it allowed 
Cameron to position himself at the head of the Remain 
campaign. On 20 February, Government announced the 
referendum on British EU membership for 23 June. The result 
of that referendum is well known, across the UK 51.9 per cent 
voted for Leave and 48.1 per cent for Remain. Cameron’s 
successor Theresa May has announced on 2 October 2016 
that the British Government will trigger Article 50 of the 
Treaty of the European Union in March 2017 starting the 
official negotiations about the terms of Brexit. 
The close result in the referendum has revealed a deep 
division in the British population. This divide is only to a 
limited extend about the different attitudes towards EU 
membership and regaining sovereignty. These issues have 
not been high in electorates priorities. Britain is divided 
across multiple dimensions – socially, geographically, 
ethnically and politically. The United Kingdom of 2016 is only 
united by name. 
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Socio-Economic and Geographic Divisions 
Some commentators have pointed towards a division 
between outward looking modernists and traditionalists who 
long to return to a glorified past (Easton 2016), but the 
underlying social tensions are much deeper and more serious. 
An analysis of the referendum shows that young, educated 
and affluent people were by far more in favour for staying in 
the EU than older and more deprived voters (YouGov 2016). 
Young people were, however, less likely to enter the poll 
stations (BBC 2016). 
A closer look at the referendum’s geography also 
demonstrates that in England striving cities, like London, 
Manchester, Liverpool, Bristol and Leeds, voted to remain, 
whereas rural and suburban constituencies opted by a 
majority for Leave. It is not only the ‘left behind’ who voted 
for leave and one can make the case that market towns are 
particularly affine to conservatism and traditions. And yet, 
the referendum unravelled the economic cleavages between 
prosperous city regions and peripheral ‘left-behind’ places 
with little prospect of overcoming their desolation. South 
Yorkshire, Lincolnshire and Lancashire are among the 
poorest areas in North West Europe (Inequality Briefing 
2014). Here, the leave vote was particularly high with 75.6 per 
cent in Boston and 73.6 per cent in South Holland (both 
Lincolnshire); 69.0 per cent in Doncaster, 68.3 per cent in 
Barnsley and 67.9 per cent in Rotherham (Yorkshire); 67.5 per 
cent in Blackpool, 66.6 per cent in Burnley and 66.2 per cent 
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in Hyndburn (Lancashire). Driving through these districts in 
the run up to the referendum, you could see the St George 
flag widely displayed expressing a desire to restore national 
pride in uncertain times. 
While public investments have targeted metropolitan areas, 
austerity policies have been particular hard for local 
authorities that rely heavily on public spending. As chancellor 
of the exchequer, George Osborne, focused on strengthening 
cities likely to generate economic growth. Communities in 
particular need suffered disproportionally from the cuts of 
social benefits and the closure of leisure centres, libraries, 
museums and bus services. As one Leave supporter from 
Blackpool told the Guardian: ’It was nice to give the 
metropolitan elite a bit of a kicking. There’s more to the UK 
than just central London.’ (Pidd 2016) 
The vote differed not only across urban and rural areas, the 
Southwest vis-à-vis the East and the North, even local 
communities are split into those who understand 
globalisation and European integration as an unpreceded 
opportunity to travel and advance and those lacking the 
capacities and mobility to enjoy this privilege. The external 
division, the inward looking mind-set, goes hand in hand with 
such internal divisions that have been a long time in the 
making. If you are young, middle class and graduated you 
were far more likely to support Remain than older members 
of the working class or the precariat. After the referendum, 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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(2016) released a review expressing ‘serious concern about 
the impact of regressive policies on the enjoyment of 
economic and social rights in the UK […] the Committee 
concludes that austerity measures and social security reform 
breach the UK’s international human rights obligations.’ 
Disadvantaged and marginalised peoples, low income 
families, children, persons with disabilities, minority groups 
and single parent families are particularly affected by 
poverty. It is not only people without employment but the 
‘working poor’ who suffer deprivation because the national 
minimum wage zero-hours contracts do not ensure a ‘decent 
standard of living’ (ibid.). 
When in 2011 riots took place in London, Birmingham, 
Manchester, Liverpool and other cities, the UK Government 
did not engage in a sensitive debate on the socio-economic 
causes for the outbreaks, but instead, imposed harsh 
measures on the rioters. In her first speech as Prime Minister 
of the UK, Theresa May drew the right conclusion of the out 
vote by emphasising the need to build a more socially just 
Union. She recognises that ‘if you’re born poor you will die on 
average nine years earlier than others […] if you’re a white 
working class boy you’re less likely than anybody else in 
Britain to go to university […] You have a job, but you don’t 
always have job security…You can just about manage, but 
you worry about the cost of living and getting your kids into a 
good school.’ How May and her Government will put these 
realisations into effective policies remains to be seen. Whilst 
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she promised to protect worker’s rights after Brexit, she also 
plans to allow the creation of new grammar schools which 
can chose their students and thereby neglect children from 
poorer households. The British economy faces tough times, 
which will make it difficult to invest in public welfare. 
Ethnic Divisions 
Among the ‘left-behind’ populist movements, like UKIP, gain 
ground by providing simple answers to complex questions. 
Both Nigel Farage’s Leave.EU and the more moderate Vote 
Leave, supported by Boris Johnson, Michael Gove and Gisela 
Stuart, fought ‘to take back control of our country’, and 
primarily control of the borders. Prior to the referendum, 
limiting immigration had been a top priority for voters 
(Jordan 2015). The Leave campaign nurtured and exploited a 
hostile climate for immigrants particularly from eastern 
Europe and the Middle-East, but also for non-white 
communities that have lived in the UK for generations. 
Labour MP Jo Cox who was not only compassionately 
supporting Remain but also the representative of an 
ethnically diverse constituency. She stood up for mutual 
tolerance and was engaged in fighting anti-Muslim attacks, 
which have risen by about 80 per cent in 2015. Her murder on 
16 June 2016 by the right-wing extremist Thomas Mair, who 
shouted ‘Britain First’ as he attacked Cox, left many in shock 
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and led to the suspension of campaigning for two days, but 
it did not stop the xenophobic sentiment among the Leave 
campaign. An hour before her death, UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage launched the infamous Breaking Point poster that 
warned of the stream of Syrian refugees by stating ‘we 
must break free of the EU and take back control of our 
borders’. 
In most cases it may be wrong to accuse Leave voters 
of xenophobia – older generations of immigrants also 
support the stop of further intakes. Some areas have 
experienced a rapidly changing demography and severe 
economic and cultural challenges since citizens from 
East European countries became fully eligible to the 
Free Movement of People in 2004. Except for the UK, 
Ireland and Sweden, all other Member States temporarily 
restricted labour market access for new members. The 
native-immigrant divide is, nonetheless, real and many 
immigrants feel more aware of their outsider status now. 
The nasty tone of the Leave camp towards the issue of 
immigration has encouraged more outspoken 
xenophobia. Shortly after the referendum through 
England there have numerous reports of verbal abuse, 
xenophobic social media commentary, anti-migrant 
leaflets and a small number of physical attacks on Muslim, 
black and Asian immigrants. In the first week after 
the referendum, the police reported 331 hate crimes, five 
times as many as the weekly average of 63 (Parveen and 
Sherwood 2016). 
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Although it is not yet clear how Brexit will affect the status of 
EU and non-EU immigrants in the UK, limiting immigration is 
a priority in the Government’s negotiation with the EU. If 
Britain kept access in the Single Market as part of the 
European Economic Area, like Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, 
it would have to accept the principle of free movement of 
people. Various UK ministers, including Home Secretary, 
Amber Rudd, however, have suggested measures that would 
discriminate foreign workers in British companies, such as a 
‘naming and shaming’ companies with the highest proportion 
of non-British staff. The UK has in the past served as a model 
for multiculturalism, anti-discrimination and integrative 
policies. This image is under threat, and it will require clear 
political messages speaking out for ethnic diversity to fight 
xenophobia and preserve Britain’s reputation as a liberal 
society. 
 
Political Divisions 
The vote to leave the EU was driven by internal not by 
external politics. People who usually stay absent from the 
polling station took the unique opportunity to ‘give the 
Government a kick’, and not only the Government but the 
political class as a whole. Their vote was guided by anger 
about elitist politicians, disconnected from their 
representative, responsible for industrial and welfare policies 
that put large parts of the working class in precarious 
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situations. The referendum showed that even Labour cannot 
rely on its working class support anymore. Both major 
parties, Conservatives and Labour, share the blame for the 
distrust in politics and the turn to populist parties with UKIP 
leading the way. 
Pauline Schnapper’s chapter on the crisis of British 
democracy provides more insights into the 
disenfranchisement of the people with their political leaders 
and the decline of political trust among the population. She 
also addresses the effects of disproportional representation 
through the first-past-the-post election system in the UK 
Parliament. The mis- or underrepresentation of large social 
groups has also fostered the division of the Union of England, 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Supporter of Scottish 
independence argue that Conservative-led Governments 
never had the democratic legitimacy to rule over Scotland. 
With the EU referendum, the crisis of the Union takes on a 
new dynamic. Even though you may argue in favour for 
Scotland being significantly more Europhile than the rest of 
the UK, or whether the Scottish working classes are more 
loyal to the Scottish National Party (SNP), Scottish residents 
still voted predominantly to remain and are now faced with 
the real chance of being dragged out of the EU by England 
(and Wales). Whilst Neil McGarvey and Fraser Stewart 
highlight the difference of referendums on Scottish 
independence and the EU membership and explain why the 
Leave campaign had little resonance in Scotland, the 
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contribution of Paul Cairney elaborates on the prospect for 
Scotland’s future in the Union. In his chapter, Arjan Schakel 
suggests that Scottish independence is unlikely and a 
stronger institutionalisation of shared rule would bind the 
devolved nations into a more stable settlement, instead of 
them drifting further apart. 
The referendum also raised a set of serious issues in Northern 
Ireland. The probability of an independent Northern Ireland – 
or even a reintegration into the Republic of Ireland – is not the 
same as for Scotland. Serious challenges will emerge for the 
still fragile peace process and the relations between the UK 
and the Southern and Northern parts of the Irish isle. These 
are thoroughly discussed in Paul Carmichael’s chapter. 
In addition to serious issues of devolution and political 
misrepresentation, it is important to understand that 
divisions are entrenched in the culture of British politics. The 
underlying dynamic of Westminster democracy is 
competition (Sturm 2015, 65) promoting a ‘winner takes it all’ 
mentality that lacks in ambition to compromise and an 
adversarial political culture that is rather country-dividing 
than country-uniting (King 2001). In this sense, the 
democratic understanding in British politics is a limited one, 
based on a top-down view in which governments are decisive 
not responsive. As Marsh et al. 2003 (312) put it: ‘the British 
political tradition emphasizes the idea that a responsible 
government is one which is willing and able to take strong, 
decisive, necessary action, even if that action is opposed by a 
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majority of the population.’ Unlike consensus-oriented 
democracies, the UK’s majoritarian system does not provide 
a protection for minorities. This principle also applies for the 
EU referendum after which a slight majority of 52 per cent get 
their will at the expense of 48 per cent of the voters – and 
others who could or have not voted. 
The pluralistic election system produces an adversarial style 
of debate unable to reconcile different interests and needs in 
society. All devolved assemblies are elected through a mix of 
majoritarian and proportional representation that allows 
smaller parties to establish themselves and requires the 
devolved executives to cooperate with other parliamentary 
groups. In the UK Parliament, however, the majority party 
has no incentive to find consensus with other political forces 
but is mostly concerned about serving a small share of the 
population who voted for them. I am not suggesting that this 
phenomenon is unknown to other countries but, unlike many 
modern democracies, British politics is still strongly 
characterised by hording power rather than sharing it (King 
2001). Hence, a system of government that, for a long time, 
provided strong leadership through clear parliamentary 
majorities has become the source of social and political 
incoherence and instability. 
Adversarial politics do not serve well for a reasonable 
exchange of arguments. The referendum campaign has been 
a particularly bad example of a nasty political discussion not 
guided by facts but by exaggerations and lies. One of the 
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most infamous untruths was printed in large letters on a red 
campaign bus, claiming that the UK would ‘send the EU £350 
million a week’ that could be used for the National Health 
Service. Shortly after the referendum leading Leave 
campaigners distanced themselves from this claim, along 
with promises to reduce immigration significantly. The 
mutual accusations of politicians in both camps has caused 
further damage to the levels of political trust. When the 
people realise that Brexit is not some miraculous cure to all 
their problems, and the promises made will not substantialise 
as expected, their disillusion will manifest or grow further. 
It is striking that neither Government nor the Leave side had 
any plan for the case of Brexit. What good is sovereignty 
when nobody wants to take responsibility? Cameron, the 
long-term facilitator of the referendum, resigned, Farage 
‘wanted his life back’, and it is doubtable whether Boris 
Johnson ever really wanted to leave the EU. Although the 
Conservative party managed to find a new Prime Minister 
shortly after Cameron stepped down, the game Boris 
Johnson and Michael Gove played became obvious when the 
latter withdrew his support for Johnson’s leadership 
ambitions and stood himself for elections. As Nick Cohen 
(2016) put it, ‘there are liars and then there’s Boris Johnson 
and Michael Gove’; suggesting that both do politics the same 
way, namely they produce headlines in their former careers 
as journalists: getting public attention through blunt 
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statements without caring about the consequences for the 
people they are meant to represent. 
Owen Jones (2014) offers a comprehensive account of elitism 
in British politics. Cameron and Johnson both went to Eton 
College, a cradle for future Prime Ministers and the UK’s elite. 
In its privileged, competitive environment, students learn to 
treat life as a game serving their individualist interests. This 
may explain why Cameron took a gamble with such a high 
stake when he gave the British a referendum on EU 
membership. Johnson, a man who has not shied away from 
producing false news as a journalist and from insulting 
politicians from other states, did become Prime Minister but 
Johnson is now representing Britain as the Foreign Secretary. 
At the same time, the internal fight in the Labour party 
between its socialist wing, behind Jeremy Corbyn, and its 
right-wing is ongoing and fierce. In a coup attempt shortly 
after the referendum, two-thirds of Corbyn’s shadow cabinet 
stepped down and three-quarters of Labour MPs refused him 
their confidence. Instead of holding Government into 
account and providing orientation in uncertain times, Labour 
is occupied by its own internal divide. No sign of re-building 
political trust can be expected from a party in such a desolate 
shape. 
There is presently no party in sight to seriously challenge the 
Conservatives for power, and it seems unlikely that this will 
change in the foreseeable future. Even the majoritarian, 
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bipolar logic of the Westminster democracy is thus 
temporarily suspended. Without a meaningful opposition no 
one can hold the Government to account for its actions. It is 
unlikely that the Government will introduce a new system of 
proportional representation that undermine its claim to 
power. Theresa May (7 July 2016) is aware that ‘If you’re from 
an ordinary working class family, life is much harder than 
many people in Westminster realise.’ Time will show what 
policies she will initiate to overcome the cleavage between 
rulers and the ruled, and if she will act in the interest of a 
minority or a majority of the UK. The Westminster system 
does not, however, promote consensus finding and an 
adversarial political culture does not change overnight. 
The inability of UK politicians to make compromises have 
been an ongoing problem in British relations with the EU, 
particularly under Conservative Governments. This has 
undermined the country’s role in Europe and has eventually 
contributed to the external division. It will remain to be seen 
how Theresa May and her cabinet will manage to negotiate a 
withdrawal agreement beneficial for the British economy, 
whilst at the same time pleasing the Eurosceptic forces in her 
party and in the country. Whereas she modestly supported 
Remain and may take a pragmatic approach in the 
discussions to come, Boris Johnson, Foreign Secretary, and 
David Davies, Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union, both supported Leave and may be not as cooperative. 
Sandra Schwindenhammer’s contribution to this book 
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presents an insightful outlook on the procedures and 
challenges following a British notification on withdrawal from 
the EU under Article 50 TEU. 
 
Conclusion 
Large parts of the British population and its leaders have 
never been fully committed to pooling sovereignty and 
integrating with other Member States beyond economic 
cooperation. Nonetheless, the reasons that drove so many 
Brits to vote Leave in the referendum were less about a 
dissatisfaction with the EU but the expression of socio-
economic frustration, scapegoating immigrants and ethnic 
minorities, deep political distrust and anger towards a 
political elite that does not represent a high share of society. 
The referendum has made these divisions more obvious and 
triggered a public debate, which will most likely not disappear 
after the UK has left the EU. On the contrary, austerity 
measures have already widened the gap between the 
deprived and the affluent, and immediately after referendum 
markets responded negatively – the Pound Sterling lost in 
value and stock prices fell. It is not clear yet how Brexit will 
impact on trade relations, foreign investments and 
manufacturers, the UK service industry, research funds for 
universities and industry, and London’s global financial 
centre, but it is likely that Britain will undergo a ‘self-inflicted 
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recession’, or ‘DIY recession’ in Osborne’s words. More 
expensive imports will cause higher inflation and continuing 
decline of real incomes. And what about the EU immigrants 
that have made a net contribution of £25billion (Dustmann 
and Frattini 2013) to public finances between 2001 and 2011 
and helped to keep many public services going, including the 
NHS? Their loss would mean further economic decline and 
challenge the UK’s welfare systems, and thereby increase 
social inequalities and tensions. 
When, how and at what costs the break of both Unions will 
come remains to be seen. We now know that the UK 
Government wants to trigger Article 50 in spring 2017 
initiating a two-year negotiation phase after which the UK 
will cease being a member of the EU. At the moment, it looks 
like a ‘hard Brexit’ that favour control of immigration over 
access to the Single Market – prospects have further 
devaluated the Pound. Theresa May is also planning to 
introduce a Great Repeal Bill to remove the 1972 European 
Communities Act which will ‘restore’ the UK’s sovereignty 
and ‘free it to pass its own laws’, both announcement that 
would also not be reconcilable with many obligations of the 
Single Market. Whilst the external division seems 
unstoppable, containing the internal division requires 
farsighted policies sensible to the various societal needs. 
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